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Abstract 
Earlier studies on human avoidance learning showed that an avoidance response reduces the 
expectancy that a warning stimulus (WS) will be followed by an unconditioned stimulus 
(US). This modulation can transfer to WSs with which the avoidance response did not occur 
in the past. Recent studies suggest that transfer of modulation is selective in that it is stronger 
for WSs that previously went together with other avoidance responses than for WSs that never 
went together with an avoidance response. This finding has been interpreted as providing 
unique support for an occasion setting account of avoidance learning. We put forward 
alternative explanations of selective transfer of modulation in terms of the rate with which a 
WS was reinforced in the absence an avoidance response. In support of the alternative 
explanations, we found that transfer of modulation depended not on whether a WS previously 
went together with another avoidance response but on the rate with which the WS was 
reinforced in the past. We conclude that selective transfer of modulation in avoidance learning 
does not provide (unique) support for the occasion setting account. Our findings are in line 
with a revised expectancy model of avoidance learning.  
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Evidence against an occasion setting account of avoidance learning 
Avoidance responses are instrumental response that prevent exposure to aversive 
stimulation. A typical avoidance procedure entails the following sequence of events: a 
warning stimulus (WS) is followed by an aversive unconditioned stimulus (US), unless a 
particular avoidance response (R) is performed. For example, in the classical study of 
Solomon and Wynne (1953), a light (WS) was presented and was followed by an electric foot 
shock (US), unless the animal jumped to the other side of the shuttle-box (R). 
Recent studies on avoidance learning with human subjects (e.g., De Houwer, 
Crombez, & Baeyens, 2005; Declercq & De Houwer, 2008, 2009) supported an occasion 
setting account of avoidance learning. According to this theory, avoidance responses can 
function as negative occasion setters (De Houwer et al., 2005). Occasion setting refers to the 
capacity of a stimulus to disambiguate the relation between a target and a reinforcer. In the 
case of negative occasion setting, the presence of the occasion setter signals that the target 
will not be followed by the reinforcer, whereas the absence of the occasion setter signals that 
the target will be reinforced (for a review on the literature of occasion setting, see Holland, 
1992 or Schmajuk & Holland, 1998). According to Holland (1992), a negative occasion setter 
possesses three functional properties. First of all, conditioned responding towards the target is 
stronger in the absence of the occasion setter than in the presence of the occasion setter. This 
property is called trained modulation. Second, the presence of a contingency between the 
occasion setter and the reinforcer does not have an effect on the degree to which the occasion 
setter influences conditioned responding towards the target. This property is called resistance 
to counterconditioning. The third property of negative occasion setting is selective transfer. It 
refers to the observation that a negative occasion setter will also influence conditioned 
responding towards other targets, but in a selective manner: It will more strongly influence 
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conditioned responding towards targets that were previously involved in occasion setting 
training. 
During avoidance training, the WS is followed by the US in the absence of the 
avoidance response and is not followed by the US in the presence of the avoidance response. 
The structural similarity with negative occasion setting is clear: The avoidance response 
signals when the WS will or will not be followed by the US. De Houwer et al. (2005; for a 
similar study, see Declercq & De Houwer, 2008) provided evidence that an avoidance 
response and a negative occasion setter are similar at a functional level as well, by 
establishing that an avoidance response can possess the three properties of negative occasion 
setting. In their study (see the left side of Table 1, only letters without a double asterix), three 
different WSs were presented. WSs A and B were always followed by the US (100% 
reinforced), whereas WS C was followed by the US on only half of the trials on which C was 
presented (50% reinforced). In a second learning phase, two avoidance responses were 
available, the first one after WS A and the other after WS B. WSs A and B were followed by 
the US except when the available avoidance response was emitted. In a next learning phase, 
additional counterconditioning trials for the first avoidance response were presented. On these 
trials, performing the avoidance response led to the presentation of the US. In a final rating 
phase, participants rated their US expectancy in different situations.  
The results of De Houwer et al. (2005) and Declercq and De Houwer (2008) indicated 
that the presence of the avoidance response influenced US expectancies when the WS it was 
originally trained with was present (trained modulation; e.g., higher expectancy of US when 
only A is present than when A is present and R1 is emitted; see Table 1), that this influence 
on US expectancy was resistant to counterconditioning (i.e., trained modulation was equally 
large for R1 and R2), and that it transferred more to the other WS (A or B) that was also 
involved in occasion setting training than to the WS that was only partially reinforced (C) 
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(selective transfer; e.g., R1 modulated expectancies more when B was present that when C 
was present). Therefore, De Houwer et al. (2005) concluded that avoidance responses can 
function as negative occasion setters.  
Two of the three occasion setting properties can, however, also be explained in terms 
of the expectancy model of avoidance learning that was proposed by Lovibond (2006). He 
argued that participants acquire two propositions during avoidance learning: They learn that 
(a) after a particular WS, a particular US will be presented and (b) after performing a 
particular response, a particular US will be omitted. According to this model, trained 
modulation occurs because these propositions imply that the US is less likely to follow the 
WS when the avoidance response is emitted. Resistance to counterconditioning can be 
explained by a revised version of the Lovibond model in which it is assumed that the second 
proposition can be context-specific (Declercq & De Houwer, 2009, p. 127). For instance, 
participants might form the belief that the avoidance response prevents the US only when a 
WS is present. Such a belief is consistent with the fact that the avoidance response is followed 
by the US on counterconditioning trials and the fact that the US is less likely to follow a WS 
when the avoidance response is emitted. Hence, the extent to which the avoidance response 
modulates US expectancies in the context of a WS should not be influenced by 
counterconditioning on trials without a WS.  
On the other hand, neither the (revised) model of Lovibond (2006), nor any other 
model of avoidance learning, can account for the property of selective transfer of modulation 
between WSs involved in occasion setting training (i.e., WSs whose relation with the US was 
shown to depend on the presence of an avoidance response). This finding is thus considered to 
provide unique support for the occasion setting account (De Houwer et al., 2005). It is 
possible, however, that the selective transfer effect observed by De Houwer and colleagues 
was in fact unrelated to whether a WS was involved in occasion setting training. In the design 
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of De Houwer et al. (see Table 1), the training history of C differed from that of A and B not 
only with regard to the fact that only A and B were involved in occasion setting training but 
also in that only A and B were continuously reinforced on trials without an avoidance 
response. That is, unlike stimuli A and B, stimulus C was partially reinforced (50%).  
There are at least three ways in which the difference in reinforcement rate could have 
been responsible for the observed selective transfer effect. First, based on the revised model 
of Lovibond (2006; Declercq & De Houwer, 2009), one could argue that participants formed 
the belief that avoidance responses prevent the US only for WSs that were continuously 
reinforced. Such a belief can give rise to the expectancy that avoidance responses modulate 
the likelihood of the US in the context of A and B but not in the context of C, which would 
result in the observed selective transfer effect. Second, because C was partially reinforced 
whereas A and B were continuously reinforced in the absence of an avoidance response, US 
expectancy ratings were generally lower for C presented alone than for A or B presented 
alone. Because of this difference, the maximal absolute effect of the presence of an avoidance 
response (i.e., when the avoidance response completely abolished US expectancy) must be 
smaller in the presence of C than in the presence of A or B. De Houwer et al. (2005) and 
Declercq and De Houwer (2008) therefore used ratio scores that reflected the relative extent 
to which the avoidance response reduced US expectancy (e.g., the differences between US 
expectancy when only C is present and when both C and the avoidance response are present, 
divided by the US expectancy when only C is present; [C-CR] / C). Unfortunately, these ratio 
scores have poor psychometric properties, especially when the denominator approaches zero. 
For example, when a participant gave a near zero rating when only C was present and a 
slightly higher rating when both C and the avoidance response were present, this generated a 
large negative ratio that overwhelmed the smaller positive ratios of other participants. Such 
statistical biases are more likely to occur for the control stimulus C than for A and B because 
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the former stimulus is more likely to receive near zero ratings. Third, because C was followed 
by the US on 50% of the trials, participants might give a US expectancy rating for C at about 
the midpoint of the rating scale. Participants might also use the midpoint of the rating scale 
when they are uncertain about whether a US would occur in a situation. This could lead to 
artifactual selective transfer because transfer of modulation must always be calculated by 
comparing familiar situations in which a WS is presented on its own (A, B, C test trials) with 
novel situations in which a WS is present together with an avoidance response it has not yet 
been paired with (AR2, BR1, CR1, CR2 test trials; see Table 1). Hence, if participants do give 
ratings at the midpoint of the scale in novel situations, this would lead to the absence of 
modulation for C (because ratings for C are also situated at the midpoint of the rating scale) 
and the presence of modulation for A and B (because ratings for A and B are situated at the 
top of the rating scale).  
To summarize, selective transfer of modulation in avoidance learning has until now 
been regarded as providing unique support for the occasion setting account of avoidance 
learning. We argue, however, that previously observed selective transfer effects might have 
been determined not by whether a WS was involved in occasion setting training but by the 
rate with which the WS was reinforced in the absence of the avoidance response. To test this 
alternative explanation, we replicated the study of De Houwer et al. (2005) while adding a 
second control stimulus D that was always reinforced. The design can be found in Table 1. 
The method of our study was identical to that of De Houwer et al. (2005) except for issues 
related to the inclusion of control stimulus D. Based on the occasion setting explanation of 
selective transfer, we should expect an equally small amount of transfer of modulation 
towards the 50% (C) and the 100% reinforced (D) stimuli because neither was involved in 
occasion setting training. If, however, transfer of modulation is determined by the rate at 
which a WS was reinforced, then transfer to D should be as large as transfer to A and B and 
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larger than transfer to C. The latter pattern of results would show that selective transfer of 
modulation in avoidance learning is not due to the procedural element that the occasion 
setting account considers to be crucial (i.e., occasion setting training), which would imply that 
selective transfer of modulation does not provide support for the occasion setting model.  
Method 
Participants 
Forty first-year bachelor students at Ghent University took part in the experiment in 
exchange for course credits. They also received a small amount of money (on average €1) 
dependent on how successful they were in avoiding the USs.  
Stimuli and Materials  
The experiment was run on a portable computer with a 15-inch screen. Stimuli were 
presented using Affect 4.0 (Spruyt, Clarysse, Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, & Hermans, 2010). 
As WSs, we used a triangle (base = 2 cm; height = 2 cm), circle (diameter = 2 cm), square (2 
× 2 cm) and a trapezium (base = 2 cm; height = 2 cm). As US, we used a red letter X, 
presented in Arial, font size 72. The stimuli were presented in a frame that was 20 cm wide 
and 13 cm high. At the top of this frame, a smaller frame was drawn, that was 9 cm wide and 
1.5 cm high. In this frame, a message appeared that informed participants that a certain key 
was available. At the bottom of the main frame, a smaller frame was drawn, that was 5 cm 
wide and 1.5 cm high. In this frame, a response confirmation (a blue or green horizontal 
rectangle of 2 cm by 0.5 cm) was presented when participants gave a valid response. 
Participants could perform an avoidance response by pressing the D and K keys of the 
AZERTY keyboard. On the D key, a green label was attached and on the K key, a blue label 
was attached. The ratings that were presented at the end of the experiment were presented in 
Arial, font size 20. Participants could choose their rating by moving with the left and right 
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arrow over a scale from 0 (very unlikely) to 100 (very likely). The chosen rating was 
confirmed when participants pressed the ENTER button.  
Procedure 
 Participants took part individually and were seated in front of the computer screen. 
After they signed the informed consent form, instructions appeared on the screen. They were 
told that they received a credit of €13. They were also told that four different geometrical 
figures would be presented, some of which would be followed by a red X. Every time this red 
X appeared on the screen, €0.25 would be subtracted from their credit. Their main task was to 
prevent the red X from appearing on the screen. They would be able to do so by pressing 
certain keys, which would be occasionally available. Participants were encouraged to learn as 
much as possible during the experiment. After participants indicated that they had read the 
instructions, some practice trials were presented to show how a correct avoidance response 
should be executed. On these trials, no stimuli were presented and the only available key was 
the space bar.  
After these practice trials, a first learning phase started. In this phase, participants 
received four trials in which A was followed by the red X (A+ trials), four trials in which B 
was followed by the red X (B+ trials), four trials in which D was followed by the red X (D+ 
trials), two trials in which C was followed by the red X (C+ trials), and two trials in which C 
was not followed by the red X (C- trials). On these trials, the WS was presented 1500 ms after 
the onset of the frame and remained on the screen for 2000 ms. On the trials in which the US 
was presented, a red X appeared at the centre of the screen, 3000 ms after the WS 
disappeared. A message that informed participants that they lost €0.25 accompanied the US. 
The message and US remained on the screen for 1500 ms. If the US was not presented (C- 
trials), a message, that informed participants that their credit remained unchanged, appeared 
on the screen for 1500 ms, 3000 ms after the WS had disappeared. The intertrial interval was 
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5000 ms. These trials were presented in a random order. In this learning phase, no keys were 
available. However, if participants pressed one of the keys, this had no influence on the 
presentation of the US.  
In a second learning phase, participants received four trials in which WS A was 
presented and R1 was available (AR1- trials), four trials in which WS B was presented and 
R2 was available (BR2- trials), four D+ trials, two C+ trials and two C- trials. The AR1- and 
BR2- trials were identical to the A+ and B+ trials except on the following point. Immediately 
after the WS disappeared, a message that informed participants that a particular key was 
available was presented for 2000 ms. If participants made a correct response, a confirmation 
bar was presented for 1000 ms and the trial ended as a US-absent trial (see above).  
A third learning phase started immediately after the second learning phase. In this 
phase, four A+, four B+, four C+, four C-, eight D+, four AR1-, and four BR2- trials were 
presented. Additionally, eight counterconditioning (R1+) trials were presented. On these 
trials, no WS was presented. Instead, the message “press the [color of R1] key” appeared on 
the screen and remained on the screen until participants pressed the appropriate key. The 
experiment halted until participants followed the instruction to ensure that all participants 
pressed the appropriate key. Then, a confirmation bar was presented for 1000 ms and the trial 
ended as a US-present trial. 
After the third learning phase, a rating phase was presented. Participants received the 
instruction that they now had to indicate how likely they thought it would be that in a certain 
situation the red X would be presented. They would be able to do so by choosing a value 
between 0 (very unlikely) and 100 (very likely). They were also told that they would not 
receive feedback about the correctness of their rating. On each rating trial, the description of 
the situation appeared at the top of the screen. For situations in which only the WS was 
presented, the description read as follows: “If the [name of shape] is presented and you press 
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no key, how likely is it that the red X would be presented?” For situations in which the WS is 
presented and a key is pressed, the description read as follows: “If the [name of shape] is 
presented and you press the [color of key] key, how likely is it that the red X would be 
presented?” For situations in which no WS was presented and a key was pressed, the 
description read as follows: “If no shape is presented and you press the [color of key] key, 
how likely is it that the red X would follow?” The description and the rating scale disappeared 
after participants confirmed their rating. After 500 ms, a new description appeared on the 
screen. The order of these trials was random for each participant.  
Results 
As can be seen in Table 2, we observed trained modulation that was resistant to 
counterconditioning, thus replicating the results of previous studies (Declercq & De Houwer, 
2008; De Houwer et al., 2005).  In the remainder of the results section, we discuss only 
selective transfer effects because these are crucial to our main hypotheses. Because we were 
interested in selective transfer towards stimuli that had a different reinforcement history, we 
took into account only the data of participants who did differentiate between the 100% (A, B, 
and D) and 50% reinforced stimulus (C). More specifically, the data of two participants were 
removed from further analyses because their mean US expectancy after A, B, and D 
([A+B+D]/3) was lower than their US expectancy after C. Furthermore, to investigate 
selective transfer of modulation, it is important that R1 and R2 did modulate responding 
towards the WS it was originally trained with. Therefore, the data of two participants who had 
a trained modulation index for R1 and R2 (i.e., [(A-AR1) + (B-BR2)]/2) equal to or lower 
than zero, were removed from further analyses.  
Mean ratings for the remaining participants can be found in Table 1. Because US 
expectancy after C was lower (M = 49.03, WS = 11.58) than after A, B, or D (M = 94.21, WS 
= 10.45),  t(35) = -21.17, p < .001, the extent to which the presence of the avoidance 
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responses could reduce the US expectancies was lower for stimulus C than for stimuli A, B, 
and D. Therefore, in line with De Houwer et al. (2005), we decided to use the ratios instead of 
the absolute level of modulation. We calculated a ratio score separately for each combination 
of a WS (A, B, C, D) and a response (R1, R2). Each ratio corresponded to the difference 
between the expectancy rating when the WS was presented on its own and when it was 
presented in combination with an avoidance response, divided by the expectancy rating for 
when the WS was presented on its own (e.g., [C-CR1] / C).  
Transfer towards A and B versus transfer towards C 
 We first analyzed the ratio scores for BR1, CR1, AR2, and CR2 using an ANOVA 
with stimulus type (A or B versus C) and response type (R1 versus R2) as within-subjects 
variables. The main effect of stimulus type was significant, F(1, 34) = 14.06, p = .001, 
showing that transfer of modulation was stronger for A and B than for C. This replicates the 
selective transfer effect that was found by De Houwer et al. (2005) and Declercq and De 
Houwer (2008). The main effect of response type, F(1, 34) = 1.88, p = .18, and the interaction 
between stimulus type and response type, F < 1, were not significant. Hence, there was no 
indication that counterconditioning had an effect on transfer of modulation. t-Tests showed 
that selective transfer (i.e., larger ratio for A or B than for C) occurred for both the 
counterconditioned response (R1), t(34) = 2.40, p < .05, and the avoidance response that was 
not counterconditioned (R2), t(34) = 3.53, p = .001.  
Transfer towards A and B versus transfer towards D 
 Secondly, we analyzed the ratios for BR1, DR1, AR2, and DR2 using a stimulus type 
(A or B versus D) and response type (R1 versus R2) within-subjects ANOVA. This time, the 
main effect of stimulus type was not significant, F < 1. Hence, there was no indication of 
selective transfer when comparing stimuli that differed in their involvement in occasion 
setting training but that did not differ with regard to rate of reinforcement. Table 2 shows that 
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the modulating effect of the avoidance response transferred as strongly to D than to A and B, 
even though only the latter two were involved in occasion setting training. Neither the main 
effect of response type, nor the interaction between stimulus type and response type was 
significant, Fs < 1, again showing that counterconditioning did not influence transfer of 
modulation. Selective transfer was absent for both R1, t < 1, and R2, t(34) = -1.53, p = .14. 
Transfer towards D versus transfer towards C 
To compare transfer towards the control stimulus that was partially reinforced (C) and 
the control stimulus that was continuously reinforced (D), we analyzed the ratios for CR1, 
DR1, CR2, and DR2. The ANOVA with stimulus type (D versus C) and response type (R1 
versus R2) as within-subjects variables revealed a main effect of stimulus type, F(1, 34) = 
23.71, p < .001. Transfer of modulation was significantly stronger for D than for C. The main 
effect of response type approached significance, F(1, 34) = 3.76, p = .06. If anything, transfer 
of modulation was larger for the counterconditioned response (R1) than for the avoidance 
response that was not counterconditioned (R2). The interaction between stimulus type and 
response type was not significant, F(1, 34) = 1.31, p = .26. Selective transfer occurred both 
for R1, t(34) = -3.27, p < .005, and R2, t(34) = -3.98, p < .001.  
Discussion 
We further examined the occasion setting account of avoidance learning by comparing 
transfer towards a continuously (100%) reinforced stimulus and a stimulus that was partially 
(50%) reinforced. Participants first learned that stimulus A and stimulus B were always 
followed by a US except when a certain avoidance response was emitted. When they were 
afterwards asked to rate their expectancy of the US in different situations, they had a stronger 
expectation of the US when only A or only B was present then when A or B was present and 
an avoidance response was emitted. Contrary to what would be expected on the basis of an 
occasion setting account, this modulation of expectancies (a) transferred to the same extent to 
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stimuli that were involved in occasion setting training (A and B) than to a control stimulus 
that was not involved in occasion setting training but was reinforced continuously (D) and (b) 
transferred more strongly to the latter control stimulus D than to a control stimulus C that was 
also not involved in occasion setting training but was reinforced only partially. This pattern of 
results suggests that previous demonstrations of selective transfer of the moderating function 
of an avoidance response (Declercq & De Houwer, 2008; De Houwer et al., 2005) were not 
due to the occasion setting function of the avoidance response. As such, these selective 
transfer effects can no longer be regarded as supportive for the occasion setting account of 
avoidance learning.  
Nevertheless, our results do not contradict the idea that avoidance responses can 
function as negative occasion setters. For instance, some have argued that selective transfer as 
a function of occasion setting training is not a defining feature of occasion setters (e.g., 
Rescorla, 1985). Instead, resistance to counterconditioning is sometimes deemed to be the 
most central property. Given that trained modulation was resistant to counterconditioning in 
the current and previous studies, it could still be argued that the avoidance responses qualified 
as negative occasion setters. The arguments and data put forward in this paper do, however, 
invalidate the idea that selective transfer effects in avoidance learning provide unique support 
for the occasion setting account. Contrary to what is postulated in the occasion setting 
account, these effects do not seem to be related to occasion setting training but to the rate with 
which WSs were reinforced.  
The impact of reinforcement rate on selective transfer in avoidance learning is in line 
with the revised version of the expectancy account of Lovibond (2006; Declercq & De 
Houwer, 2009). According to this account, participants form context-specific propositions 
about relation between WSs and the US and about the relation between the avoidance 
response and the US. The present results can be explained by the revised expectancy model if 
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it is assumed that the reinforcement history of a stimulus (i.e., continuous or partial) can serve 
as a context that signals when the avoidance response will be effective. For instance, the 
moderating function of an avoidance response might transfer more to a continuously 
reinforced stimulus (D) than to a partially reinforced stimulus (C) because participants believe 
that the avoidance response is effective only for continuously reinforced stimuli (A or B).  
 There is another reason why we should prefer the revised expectancy model over the 
occasion setting model. According to the revised expectancy model, participants learn that in 
a particular context (a) a particular WS is followed by a particular US and (b) the performance 
of the avoidance response results in the omission of a particular US. From these propositions, 
it can be inferred that (a) in the absence of the response, the WS will be followed by the US 
and (b) in the presence of the response, the WS will not be followed by the US. These are 
exactly the propositions that underlie avoidance learning according to the occasion setting 
account. Hence, all predictions that can be derived from the occasion setting account can also 
be derived from the (revised) expectancy model. The reverse is not true: Knowing that the 
avoidance response determines whether the WS is followed by the US does not allow one to 
infer that the avoidance response (under certain conditions) causes the absence of the US. 
Therefore, in principle, the revised expectancy model can lead to predictions that are not 
supported by the occasion setting account.  
Although the expectancy theory of Lovibond (2006) is in line with the observed 
results, other explanations of the observed selective transfer effects are possible. As already 
mentioned in the Introduction, reduced transfer might arise for partially reinforced stimuli as 
the result of (a) the use of ratio scores or (b) the way in which participants use the rating scale 
when they are uncertain. Additional analyses of our data do, however, argue against the 
former possibility. First, when we investigated selective transfer by comparing the absolute 
difference scores rather than ratio scores, we observed the same results as with the ratio 
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scores: modulation of R1 and R2 transferred more to D and less to C. As already mentioned, 
because the baseline ratings for A, B and D were different from the baseline rating for C, the 
results with absolute values should be interpreted carefully. Second, only two participants 
gave a zero US expectancy rating when only C was present. All other participants gave 
ratings for C of 35 and higher. Because the ratio scores have poor psychometric properties 
primarily when the US expectancy for C approaches zero, we re-ran the analyses after 
removing the data of the two participants with a zero rating for C. We again observed 
significantly more transfer towards D than to C. We also re-analyzed the data with 
participants who had a transfer index for C ([(C-CR1) + (C-CR2)]/2] that was equal to or 
higher than zero. This led to the removal of the data of eight participants. The analyses also 
revealed more transfer towards D than to C. The additional analyses argue against an 
alternative account of our results in terms of the use of ratio scores.  
The present study has some limitations. First, our results were obtained in an 
experimental setting. In such settings, the use of truly aversive USs is for ethical reasons 
impossible. Although the results suggest that propositional reasoning can be involved in 
avoidance learning, it is possible that in real-life situations with truly fear-evoking situations, 
propositional reasoning is not as optimal and other, non-propositional processes might 
become involved. Furthermore, avoidance training was limited in length. In the literature on 
instrumental conditioning, it has been suggested that after extensive training, responding can 
become more stimulus-bound and independent of (propositions about) the outcome of the 
responses (e.g., Dickinson, Balleine, Watt, Gonzalez, & Boakes, 1995). Nevertheless, the 
presented results indicate that at least during the initial phase of acquisition, US expectancies 
may contribute to the acquisition of an avoidance response in a way that is best explained by 
the revised expectancy model of Lovibond (2006).   
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Table 1. Summary of the design and mean US expectancy and standard deviation for each situation. 
Learning Phase 1 Learning Phase 2 Learning Phase 3 Ratings Mean US expectancy*** Standard Deviation*** 
A+ AR1-* A+ A? 90.56 20.73 
B+ BR2-* AR1-* B? 94.31 15.03 
C+ C+ B+ C? 49.03 11.58 
C- C- BR2-* D?** 97.78 7.21 
D+** D+** C+ AR1? 0.97 3.34 
  C- BR1? 52.08 42.15 
  D+** CR1? 37.92 21.89 
  R1+ DR1?** 50.83 43.47 
   AR2? 53.75 41.91 
   BR2? 14.58 31.97 
   CR2? 43.89 30.87 
   DR2?** 50.83 41.55 
   R1? 89.31 26.84 
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   R2? 29.58 32.10 
 
* The US was absent only if participants pressed the appropriate key. 
** These trials were not presented in the original design of De Houwer et al. (2005).   
*** These data are based only on the data of participants who are included in the analyses of transfer (N = 36).
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Table 2. Mean US expectancy and standard deviation (SD) for the indices. 
 Index Mean SD 
A - AR1 84.87** 29.12 







(A-AR1) - (B-BR2) 9.34 36.34 
A- AR2 36.81** 40.09 
B - BR1 42.22** 41.50 




C - CR1 11.11* 24.47 
C - CR2  5.14 32.96 
([C-CR1] + [C-CR2]) 
/2 
8.12 26.04 
D - DR1 46.94** 42.35 
D - DR2 46.94** 41.79 




(A - AR2) /A 0.41** 0.45 
(B - BR1) /B 0.46** 0.44 
Proportional transfer to 
stimuli A and/or B 
([(A - AR2)/A] + [(B 
- BR1)/B]) /2 
0.43** 0.39 
AVOIDANCE LEARNING 23 
 
(C - CR1) /C 0.25* 0.43 
(C - CR2) /C 0.12 0.60 
([(C - CR1)/C] + [(C 
- CR2)/C]) /2 
0.19* 0.47 
(D - DR1) /D 0.49** 0.43 
(D - DR2) /D 0.48** 0.42 
Proportional transfer to 
stimuli C or D 
([(D - DR1)/D] + [(D 
- DR2)/D]) /2 
0.48** 0.41 
 
* A one-sample t-test indicated that this index was significantly different from zero, p < .05. 
** A one-sample t-test indicated that this index was significantly different from zero, p < 
.001. 
